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Abstract 
‘Digital Preservation’ as a concept is an albatross. The 
complex and somewhat arcane nature of the practice has kept it 
from being embraced by those that perhaps need it most. Changes 
in terminology, misunderstandings of meanings and a lack of 
direct business planning have brought about a state of affairs that 
has the digital preservation community fighting the problem of 
technological obsolescence without sustained support from 
organisations that supposedly need it most.  
Organisations care about ensuring their continued existence 
and profitability. Investment is only undertaken after reflection on 
business cases.  In creating a business case most people focus 
primarily on cost, but there must be a counter-veiling focus on 
value. There is no point in making an investment unless it has 
worth to the investor. A good business case will display a strong 
understanding of the value of information objects that 
organisations create.  Information professionals must ensure that 
their desire to ensure longevity of information is tied coherently 
and explicitly to that of the organisation’s future and detail why 
the digital materials are of value to it. Exploring value in this way 
allows engagement with senior management as it wraps the need 
for action in the terminology of their strategic vision and allows 
for a strong and successful business case to be made.  
Introduction 
 
“The land of ice and of fearful sounds, where no living thing 
was to be seen.  Till a great sea-bird, called the Albatross, came 
through the snow-fog and was received with great joy and 
hospitality.  And lo! the Albatross proveth a bird of good omen, 
and followeth the ship as it returned northward through fog and 
floating ice.”[1] 
 
Digital Preservation - what is it?  The preservation of digits?  
Is this the real task?  As information professionals should we not 
centre our interest on the preservation of information rather than 
developing digital preservation as mysterious?  Managers of 
enterprises are interested in managing the business - its processes, 
people, information and outputs.  Digital preservation is not an end 
in itself, it is just a set of technical - how - things.  In the early 
stages of any development, people tend to concentrate on the 
mechanics, rather than on that which is really important - what - 
and the purpose - why.  The result is that this activity has tended to 
be funded through short-term projects focusing on how.  What is 
now needed is for these practices to be seen as part of mainstream 
activity; which they surely are and to get their funding as part of 
the mechanisms that fund the other aspects of normal business 
activity.  As yet few good business cases have been made for 
digital preservation per se.  This is principally because most 
project proposals have concentrated on threats and ensuing costs, 
not why digital assets are to be preserved.  As soon we start to 
consider why, then we are talking about the value or benefit that 
such an investment might bring.  Value is not absolute in that it is 
critically dependent on the question “to whom?” and “when?”.  In 
the case of an enterprise, this  must be through a dynamic 
alignment with the purpose and strategy of the organisation. 
It is our contention that the term 'digital preservation' 
encourages a ghetto of practice and practitioner that hinders the 
embedding of overall good practice in information object creation 
and management into organisations - it is seen as an arcane art, 
something distinct, rather than something which should be a part 
of everyday activity.  If we believe that information assets are in 
need of management and preservation, which we do, then the 
value of such activities in whatever medium the information is 
represented needs to be clearly expressed for decision makers, so 
that they understand what the magnitude (and other parameters of 
their investment) is, the value or benefit that derives from it and 
the risks inherent in making or not making the investment.  This is 
the stuff of which business cases have been made traditionally for 
a wide variety of projects in government and commerce, but which 
presents considerable challenges when the benefits are not 
financial or tangible, but concern such difficult ideas as 
‘reputation’, ‘innovativeness’, ‘motivation’ ‘process capability’ 
‘customer satisfaction’ and ‘cultural heritage’ as they now do in 
information management in the digital age. 
Business Case 
Business cases are a concise non-threatening way of 
presenting investment opportunities.  In order to decide whether or 
not to invest, the decision maker needs three pieces of information:  
• the quantity of resource that must be invested (costs),  
• what the investment is expected to deliver (benefits), 
• the uncertainty in the size of the costs and whether or not the 
benefits will accrue (risks).   
The decision to invest will only be made if these three factors 
fall within certain parameters (whether explicitly outlined or not). 
What is needed in information management is a simple (but not 
simplistic) model of cost, benefit and risk, that makes it straight-
forward to construct business cases that appeal to decision-makers 
in terms with which they and their stakeholders are familiar, rather 
than in the obscure language of ‘digital preservation’.  The espida 
project is developing just such a model and is testing it out in the 
University of Glasgow and elsewhere.  Too many factors, not least 
the human factor, make producing the ‘perfect business case’ an 
impossibility, this model therefore does not attempt to do so, nor 
does it offer information professionals a specific tool to gain an 
advantage in the decision-making process - the same model could 
be used by anyone wishing to commend a course of action to 
decision-makers).  Rather, the model presents a way of  
communicating effectively intangible value so that it can be 
understood and can have influence in investment decisions 
alongside harder, financial benefits.  It is relatively simple to show 
how the purchase of a new machine will increase productivity and 
  
therefore add value, it is much more difficult, as the dotcom 
bubble demonstrated, to do the same for information objects. 
Cost 
The costs of ‘doing something’ can be determined relatively 
easily once certain assumptions have been made.  Our approach to 
cost is therefore uncomplicated and does not seek to replicate the 
excellent work that has already been done in many places to 
produce tools that estimate the costs and economies of scale of 
specific information preservation actions.  The model points to 
tools that can help pull together the financial costs but does not 
offer direct guidance on the use of these.  Costs will include the 
direct costs of the equipment, software and staff and these will 
consist of both Capital costs and Revenue (or recurrent) costs. 
Obviously these costs must be modeled over the length of time that 
the information must be preserved and when appropriate finally 
destroyed. They should not cover just the initial period of 
establishment of a repository or the ingest of material. 
In our work, we are not prescriptive about the basis of 
costings, but we do require that the basis on which figures are 
calculated or given is made explicit, so that decision-makers can 
judge the reliability and whether or not they are realistic.  
Value 
Benefits are the primary reason for making an investment, 
financial or otherwise.  It is of paramount importance to be able to 
communicate effectively the benefits gains to those being asked to 
make an investment and their stakeholders.  It is clear that in 
talking about information resources we are, for the most part, 
talking about intangible assets and that value based simply on 
financial measures is inadequate.  Whilst it is possible to try to 
convert all value to a monetary value, doing so can be misleading, 
time-consuming, unrepresentative and counter-productive. This 
was the painful lesson of the dotcom boom. How best then to 
communicate the benefits and thereby attract investment? 
The latent value that is capable of producing benefit is 
multifaceted.  Intangible value is therefore very difficult to 
deconstruct and communicate.  Exploring the world of intangible 
value, led us to a technique used for business performance 
(amongst other things) called the Balanced ScoreCard (BSC), 
developed by Kaplan and Norton at the Harvard Business 
School.[2]  We have repurposed Kaplan and Norton’s concept in a 
fairly cavalier way, but according to a range of external assessors 
of the project the result seems to be promising. 
A basic premise is that value is not absolute, but must be seen 
in relation to the strategic goals over time of the organisation 
bearing the costs.  The Balanced ScoreCard was designed as a 
performance measurement tool to allow senior management to 
monitor the performance of their company (or parts of it) in line 
with its strategic aims.  The adaptation has two roles: it allows 
producers of a business case to consider and communicate all areas 
of value from which the organisation will reap benefit; and, it also 
acts as an investment measurement tool for senior management.  
The espida Balanced Score Card (sic) is illustrated below and 
views value from four distinct perspectives, of which only one is 
concerned with financial value.  It explores the perspectives of : 
• the customers (what value does the information asset bring for 
customers?);  
• the internal business processes (does the information asset 
help the way the organisation carries out its business?); 
•  the innovation and learning perspective (can the information 
asset help the organisation develop?); and finally  
• the financial perspective (does the information asset bring 
financial savings or income?).  
These perspectives can be broken down into constituent 
elements (see Appendix 1).  It is vital that these perspectives and 
elements are fully aligned with the strategic aims of the funding 
organisation: the business case as a whole (be it buying a digital 
repository, resources for cataloguing or records management) must 
show value that will be of benefit to the organisation otherwise the 
information asset is not relevant to that organisation and there will 
be no investment.  The elements listed in the appendix reflect the 
directions from which value in information assets comes in the 
case of the University of Glasgow, but whilst some of these are 
appropriate to a wide range of activities and organisations, others 
are quite specific to a research-led university.  This alignment with 
strategic objectives (broadly specified) is why ‘digital 
preservation’ is an albatross.  It has not placed sufficient emphasis  
on the question ‘why’, it has presumed that the materials at risk are 
of concern to the organisation without specifically asking or 
answering the question ‘why should these information assets be 
preserved in the first place?’.  The focus has been on funding an 
action, rather than the benefit of that action.  
 
 
Figure 1. espida Balanced Score Card (BSC) 
Clearly in this formulation, an information asset might 
produce negative value if it reduces rather than increases one of 
the Score Card elements.  It is this capacity to produce negative 
value that records managers sometimes refer to as risk.  In the 
espida model value can be negative or positive, but investments 
will be targeted at courses of action that produce a net positive 
value rather than a net negative value. We can observe much the 
same process at work with physical assets, where the pay back 
from the cost of an investment is less than the outlay. 
  
Value Metrics 
With regard to metrics, we have rejected the idea of having 
globally applicable measures of value, since agreeing on common 
currencies would be an impossible task and, in any event, will 
change over time.  Instead we put the onus on the ‘project’ 
proposer to indicate how they will know that the value indicated 
has been realised.  In indicating suggested ‘metrics’ to the funder, 
the proposer has to strike a balance between talking the ‘project’ 
up and setting targets that cannot be delivered.  Our evaluators 
have been very positive about this approach that again has its 
equivalent in tangible assets, for example the output of a specific 
process. 
Proposing a metric with which to measure the attainment of 
the benefit allows monitoring of the investment, acts as an 
important way of communicating of the strength of value and 
gives the proposer buy-in.  As an example, if a business case was 
being made for the construction of a trusted digital repository.  It 
might be that this would be deemed to bring strong value in 
relation to information accessibility and the measure of success 
might be attracting 10,000 hits per month.  This measurement 
offers senior management a scale to the benefit that the proposer 
thinks is attainable for the investment and allows them to monitor 
the success of the investment subsequently.  This measurement 
framework helps the proponents to keep a sense of perspective.  
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty or risk plays a major role in any investment 
decision. Reaction to uncertainty is dependant on the risk appetite 
of  decision maker.  Those that are risk adverse will view a 
medium risk in a very different way than those that are risk takers 
(it can often be seen that the public sector is more risk adverse than 
the private sector).  It is very important therefore to not only be 
able to communicate what the degree of risk is, but also what the 
perception of these risks is.  
The term Risk Analysis is often employed to mean - 
producing a horrifying list of possible contingencies that we must 
try to avoid.  Any formulation of risk means very little if the 
following three components are not all present for all the items on 
such a list:- 
1.  a contingency (the element itself in this case) 
2. the likelihood (of a element being realised) 
3. the impact (the size of the element in terms of what it delivers 
to the organisation) 
Possible courses of action to mitigate the risk can be 
formulated to remove the contingency, reduce the likelihood or 
lower the impact.   
Preserving information assets or disposing of them involves 
two sort of uncertainty: 
• the proposed benefits failing to materialise in spite of the 
investment, 
• possibility of making the wrong decision.   
The risk is in the first case is that for one of a number of 
reasons the information assets were over-valued and in the second 
case it is concerned with the consequences of the decision itself 
being wrong in relation to the likelihood of this being so.  
In our model we accept that no investment is certain to 
produce the benefit slated for it and ask the propser to indicate 
likelihood.  We recognise that if large benefits are claimed for an 
investment, then the risk of the investment delivering will be lower 
than if the benefits suggested are lower and would therefore 
counsel realism over hyperbolic optimism when assessing the 
benefits of a project, an observable tendency in our experience in 
the digital order. 
The uncertainty within the model is concerned only with the 
risks that impact on the decision making process, this means that 
risks that come into play during the actual investment are not 
considered in detail.  (These should be taken care of by budgeted 
contingencies.)  Primary uncertainties in the model are therefore 
whether the outlined values will come to pass and if the recurring 
costs outlined are likely to rise or fall. 
Making Decisions 
In our experience decision-makers need to be able to:  
• recognise the different types of value (1 above),  
• have a realistic idea of the likelihood of any element being 
realised (positive or negative) (2 above), and  
• have some measure of the magnitude of the value (3 above), in 
order to judge whether or not the investment is sound.   
The judgment itself clearly depends on what the competing 
demands for resources are and how risk averse the organisation 
concerned is. 
The current state of our methodology is that we have 
templates for Value and Cost, that have been tested by a number of 
external evaluators and refined to take account of their feedback.  
The Value template that we are using in the University of Glasgow 
contains the perspectives and elements in appendix 1, aligned 
directly with the strategic goals of that Institution with the help of 
the primary architects of the University Strategic Plan. Within this 
template, the strength of the value (be it positive or negative), the 
likelihood of the organisation receiving benefit from the 
investment and the timescale of this benefit coming to pass are all 
required. Crucially, it also requires measurement metrics to 
indicate what the benefit will be.  (The model includes 
mechanisms for modeling value over time as its shape can change 
dramatically and that can have important repercussions for 
investment decisions.) 
These templates are used by the proposer of a ‘project’ or 
‘activity’ to indicate what costs they expect and to provide a 
profile of the expected returns in value (positive and negative) 
terms.  The templates concentrate attention on:- 
• the nature of benefits and dis-benefits that might be expected, 
• the size of these returns - in relative terms within the project 
not global terms, on the grounds that this allows the ‘funder’ 
to see clearly where the main elements of value are, 
• the timescale of returns, 
• getting the proposer to indicate how the value can be 
measured, which provides a basis for both deciding whether or 
not to invest and for evaluating the investment in a post-
implementation review at later stages, 
• making the proposer ‘show their working’ and explain how 
they come to their conclusion that the project is worthwhile. 
The reality of decision-making is that those making the 
decisions will have to choose between a variety of very different 
projects when deciding how to invest the money available.  The 
cost and benefit templates make it much easier for those involved 
to see clearly what they might get for their money and to ask for 
clarification where it is needed. 
  
Conclusion 
Whilst we set out to provide a way of indicating value of 
digital resources, it has since become apparent that there are a 
large number of areas where the developing methodology might be 
appropriate:- 
• business cases - for projects involving intangible benefits, 
• impact of change - for comparing a change proposal with the 
current situation, 
• evaluation of proposals - providing a ‘level playing field’ for 
comparing a range of different proposals, where benefits are 
often expressed by the proponents in hyperbolic prose, making 
comparison and evaluation difficult. 
In addition discussions with a number of people with 
expertise in different areas indicate that there is clear interest in the 
applicability of this type of approach in the following areas:- 
• Digital Preservation 
• Information Technology/Information Systems projects 
• Library and Archival Collections 
• Cultural Heritage 
‘Should I shoot the albatross?’ the mariner could have asked 
himself (and possibly should have).  What may happen if I do not 
shoot it and what may happen if I do?  Whether the mariner 
carried out what would now be known as option appraisal is 
uncertain, but within the context of the model the options are the 
same: to do or not to do something. 
What we are arguing is that for the preservation of 
information in digital form to become part of mainstream activity, 
it needs to be subject to the same sort of justification as any other 
form of investment.  So long as it is seen as a separate activity, 
carried out by a group of ‘anoraks’ who ‘specialise in that sort of 
thing’, it will remain under-funded, under-valued and mis-
understood by the people who run organisations.  We propose a 
practical way of making this a reality.  Of course in advocating a 
course of action that might be seen as “shooting the albatross”, we 
risk the fate of the Ancient Mariner: 
 
“And ever and anon throughout his future life an agony 
constraineth him to travel from land to land and to teach by his 
own example, love and reverence to all things that God hath made 
and loveth.”[1] 
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Appendix 1: Balanced Score Card Elements 
Innovation and Development Perspective 
• Intellectual capital  
• Motivation, fulfillment and satisfaction (of staff)  
• Quality and potential of research  
• Quality and potential of teaching  
• Responsiveness to change 
Internal Business Process Perspective 
• Information accessibility  
• Efficiency of operation and productivity  
• Effectiveness of decision making  
• Process potential and organisational flexibility  
• Compliance with legislation and regulation 
Customer and External Stakeholder Perspective 
• Contribution to culture and community  
• Reputation, brand and customer confidence (in all who deal 
with the University and in the public at large)  
• Customer satisfaction and service delivery (students, parents, 
public, etc.)  
• Academic attractiveness (to potential students, staff, academic 
partners and funding agencies)  
• Commercial attractiveness (to potential sponsors and 
collaborators) 
Financial Perspective 
• Income generation  
o selling assets 
o licensing/rights to assets  
o teaching and research  
o contracts, grants, fees, donations, etc.  
• Cost saving  
o labour, time  
o space  
o direct expenditure 
